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Abstract 
This paper examines the relations between the disciplinary role of Japanese relationship-oriented 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors, and 
pay–performance sensitivity in Japan. Previous studies show that pay–performance sensitivity is 
positive and almost the same as in a market-oriented system like that of the USA. However, under 
the Japanese relationship-oriented system, pay–performance sensitivity may be controlled by 
financial keiretsu ties and bank-appointed directors. We find that the disciplinary mechanism of 
keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed monitors did not function well in Japan in the 1990s. 
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1. Introduction 
Japanese corporate governance mechanisms are relationship oriented systems and are different from 
the US market-oriented systems. In the 1990s, there were no Japanese firms with compensation 
committees that included ‘outside’ directors to monitor executives and provide incentives, unlike in the 
United States. Aoki (1990) indicates that some kind of discipline may be imposed by the main banks 
during financial distress. Furthermore, financial keiretsu ties are organized around the main bank and the 
disciplinary roles of banks are expected to be stronger in firms having financial keiretsu ties. Therefore, 
bank-appointed monitors and financial keiretsu ties are expected to be features of Japanese disciplinary 
mechanisms. 
These differences in governance mechanisms between the US and Japan might affect the incentive 
mechanisms for executives. However, there remains an empirical question as to whether bank-appointed 
monitors and keiretsu memberships help to provide the executives with desirable incentive compensation 
packages. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relations between the role of bank-appointed monitors and 
financial keiretsu memberships, and pay–performance sensitivity. We implicitly assume that banks and 
financial keiretsu members can better observe the behavior of executives, and the information gained is 
used to determine the structure of compensation and incentives for executives. Previous studies show 
positive relations between changes in managerial compensation and firm performance in the 1980s and 
1990s in Japan. In the Japanese relationship oriented system, there is an important perception about the 
effect of bank-appointed monitors and keiretsu memberships on pay–performance relations. 
Our findings in this paper are summarized as the following two main points. The first finding is that 
there is no significant relation between pay–performance sensitivity and firms with and without financial 
keiretsu ties from 1992 to 1995, which is consistent with previous studies. Second, pay–performance 
sensitivities for stock returns and sales growth decrease in firms with bank-appointed directors. We   4
conclude that the disciplinary mechanism of the Japanese relationship-oriented system such as financial 
keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors did not function well in Japan during the 1990s. 
 
2. The determination of managerial compensation in Japan 
Holmstrom (1979) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict pay–performance relations based on 
agency theory. Their approach is based on a misalignment between the interests of stockholders and 
managers in the public firm. If conflicts between stockholders and managers are not resolved, the 
stockholders design compensation packages for managers to minimize the conflicts. These agency models 
suggest that different corporate governance mechanisms may result in differences in compensation 
packages. We empirically analyze managerial compensation under the Japanese relationship-oriented 
system. 
There are some basic differences between the US and Japanese systems in who sets managerial 
compensation and how it is set. In large US corporations, the compensation level of directors is approved 
by the firm’s compensation committee including two or more ‘outside’ directors. Murphy (1999) 
indicates that such compensation committees are expected to be independent of the CEO to some extent 
and function as a kind of effective corporate governance mechanism. In Japan, however, there were no 
compensation committees before the amendment of commercial law in 2002. Directors provide initial 
recommendations for their own compensation levels, which are approved by the annual general meeting 
of stockholders. As a result, the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance is weaker in 
Japan. 
In the USA, from this agency view, the board of directors looks after shareholders’ interests and 
provides desirable incentives for managers. Previous empirical studies in the USA such as Mehran (1995), 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), and Hartzell and Starks (2003) show that the board’s monitoring   5
                                                
intensity and the pay–performance sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation are increase with the board’s 
independence from the CEO.
1 
The Japanese corporate governance system is relationship-oriented (Aoki, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). In a relationship-oriented system, banks and business groups such as financial keiretsu would 
effectively function as a corporate governance mechanism. In previous Japanese studies, Kaplan and 
Minton (1994) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) find that banks are more likely to appoint their 
employees as directors when a company is in financial distress and investigate whether main banks 
monitor and control the firms with financial keiretsu ties. Kato (1997) and Basu et al. (2007) find that 
compensation for CEOs of firms with financial keiretsu ties is lower. 
Bank-appointed directors on company boards may be expected to provide desirable incentives for 
executives in Japan.
2 Abe et al. (2005) point out that the bank-appointed directors can affect the 
determination of executive salaries and bonuses because they have access to information on the firm’s 
decision making because they attend the firm’s board meetings. 
 
3. Data and empirical strategies 
3.1 Data 
We choose the sample period 1992–1995 because we can only compare the same managerial 
compensation package for all manufacturing firms as cash compensation.
3 Stock options were unavailable 
 
1 Ozerturk (2005) constructs a theoretical model to explain these empirical findings. 
2 Essentially, the main bank is the largest lender and it gathers vital information on its lender firms and sends their 
employees to the borrower’s board. 
3 Many previous studies such as Joh (1999) focus on manufacturing firms. This paper also analyzes how 
manufacturing firms control for some of the industry-specific effects on pay–performance relations. In particular,   6
                                                                                                                                                             
until they were legalized in 1997 and so all executives were paid cash compensation and bonuses during 
this period. 
The sample consists of 2088 observations from 1992 to 1995 for 522 Japanese manufacturing firms 
publicly trading on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The firms were subdivided into 15 
manufacturing industry groups. The financial data were obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS database. The 
Nikkei NEEDS data were sourced from annual company reports that contain a panel of cash 
compensation data in the financial statements. Data on characters and number of board members were 
manually collected from Yakuin Shiki Ho (1992–1996). The financial keiretsu ties data are collected from 
Kigyo Keiretsu Souran (1991). We construct the financial keiretsu dummy which indicates whether or not 
each firm belongs to an executive gathering known as Shacnokai (presidents’ club)
4 following Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2001). 
Data on compensation for Japanese CEOs are not publicly available, and are only available for total 
salaries and bonuses earned by all directors. Prior studies by Kaplan (1994), Ang and Constand (1997), 
and Joh (1999) calculate the average director’s compensation by dividing total salaries and bonuses of all 
 
nonmanufacturing industries such as construction suffer from ‘bad loan’ problems. Therefore, we exclude the 
nonmanufacturing industry. 
4 Japanese financial keiretsu consists of six major financial groups: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and 
Daiichi-Kangyo.   7
                                                
directors by the number of directors.




3.2 Descriptive statistics 
We provide the definitions of the variables (ΔCashComp, ΔROA, RET, GSALE, LOSS, K, and B) in 
Table 1 and their descriptive statistics in Table 2. Table 2 shows that the change ratio of managerial cash 
compensation (ΔCashComp) was –0.17% from 1992 to 1995.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 and 2 HERE 
 
We employ four firm performance variables: the first difference in ROA (ΔROA), stock returns (RET), 
the growth rate of sales (GSALE), and a loss/profit dummy variable (LOSS). The average of ΔROA was 
–0.187%, and that of lagged ΔROA was –0.493%. The average of RET was approximately –6.29%, and 
that of lagged RET was –9.135%. This means that firm accounting performance was slightly negative, but 
market performance was highly negative. The average of the growth rate was –1.66%, and that of the loss 
 
5 Joh (1999) points out that the incentive compensation of directors on the board as a group is more adequate than 
that of the top manager alone because the board members make decisions regarding the firm’s product market 
strategy as a group. Regarding this point, Kubo and Saito (2008) try to estimate a proxy for top manager 
compensation. Kato and Rockel (1992), Kato (1997), and Kato and Kubo (2006) adopt CEOs’ individual 
compensation data of Japanese largest firms. 
6 Some kind of less visible compensation such as perquisites cannot be included in this average compensation. Kato 
and Long (2006), for example, calculate executive compensation including perquisites in China. In this paper, we 
cannot use such compensation data; however, the time-invariant heterogeneity of compensation such as perquisites 
are controlled by using first differences of the estimation.    8
                                                
dummy was 16.2%. The average of the financial keiretsu dummy (K) was 11.3%. The average of the 
bank-appointed monitor ratio (B) was 38.7% and is smaller than that of the 55 electronics firms used in 
Abe et al. (2005). 
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics classified by K and B are shown in Table 3. In panel A, the 
change ratio of Managerial compensation and all firm performance variables are insignificant. In panel B, 
the change ratio of Managerial compensation and firm performance variables (ΔROA, RET, and GSALE) 
are insignificant. The ratio of LOSS firms with bank-appointed directors was 18.5% and was higher than 
that without bank-appointed directors. This result is consistent with those of Kaplan (1994) and Kaplan 
and Minton (1994). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
3.3 Empirical strategies 
We estimate two equations to check the pay–performance relations and the difference in these 
relations between firms with and without financial keiretsu ties and with and without bank-appointed 
directors. The performance variables are chosen following the previous Japanese studies of Kaplan (1994), 
Kato and Kubo (2006), and Mitsudome et al. (2008).
7  We predict that Japanese managerial 
compensation is positively affected by a change in the performance measures ΔROA and GSALE, and 
negatively by a change in LOSS following the previous results. 
To provide statistical evidence for the differences in pay–performance sensitivities between firms with 
and without financial keiretsu ties, we estimate equation (1) below for firms with and without them. 
 
7 Kaplan (1994), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) show that CEO turnover in Japanese 
capital markets is closely related to poor stock performance, as it is in the US market. Previous studies cannot uniquely predict whether or not keiretsu memberships affect the determination of 
the pay–performance relations. 
 
it t it t 9, it it t 8, it it t 7, it it t 6,
it it t 5, it t 4, it t 3, it t 2, it t 1, ,
ε + d K K * K * K * RET
K * ROA + + SALE + RET + ROA
+ + Δ + Δ + +
Δ Δ = Δ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
LOSS GSALE
LOSS G CashComp t i     ) 1 (
 
There are two predictions about the discipline of financial keiretsu ties in Japan. Some scholars point 
out that the discipline of executives is characterized by their keiretsu relationships.
8 Berglof and Perotti 
(1994) argue that the financial keiretsu system plays a role in effectively monitoring and controlling 
managers. Therefore, managerial compensation should be lower for firms with financial keiretsu ties. On 
the other hand, Gurati and Singh (1998) argue that coordination costs among keiretsu memberships 
reduce profits of firms with financial keiretsu ties. In addition, Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) point out that 
financial keiretsu takes only a ceremonial role. These studies imply that the financial keiretsu system 
might be an ineffective discipline mechanism. 
We cannot initially determine whether or not the disciplinary mechanisms of firms with keiretsu 
membership are effective. We construct two hypotheses about their disciplinary roles. The null hypothesis 
is that financial keiretsu memberships take important roles in monitoring the executives of firms and 
helping to enhance the incentive of executives. Some scholars, such as Berglof and Perotti (1994), argue 
that the financial keiretsu system takes a role in the effective monitoring and controlling of managers and 
compensation should be lower for firms with financial keiretsu ties. Kato (1997) and Basu et al. (2007) 
show that top managerial compensation is lower for firms with financial keiretsu ties. In other words, 
                                                 
8 Sheard (1989) and Aoki (1990) argue that Japanese main bank relationships play an important role in corporate 
governance and discipline managers for poor performance. Aoki (1990) further argues that the main bank monitors 
its keiretsu firms in the roles of major stockholders and principal lenders. 
  9financial keiretsu ties are expected to be important corporate governance mechanisms for monitoring the 
executives of firms and helping to enhance the incentives of executives. 
We alternatively hypothesize that the main bank does not monitor the executives of firms with 
financial keiretsu ties effectively and does not enhance but rather decreases the incentives of executives 
with them. Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) suggest that the Japanese economy began to underperform in 1992 
and McGuire and Dow (2008) point out that this under-performing economy during 1990s may have 
affected the roles of the financial keiretsu. Hoshi (2006) concludes that Japanese resource allocations are 
inefficient because of support for weaker keiretsu member firms, which they call “Zombie” firms. These 
results suggest that pay–performance relations might be weaker in the 1990s in firms with financial 
keiretsu ties. 
We propose a hypothesis about the cross terms of the keiretsu dummy and four performance variables: 
ΔROA*K, RET*K, GSALE*K, and LOSS*K. In the null hypothesis (Hypothesis 1N), we predict that the 
contribution of keiretsu memberships is to strengthen pay–performance sensitivity. On the other hand, the 
pay–performance relations in firms with financial keiretsu ties are predicted to be weakened in the 
alternative hypothesis (Hypothesis 1A). 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The null hypothesis (Hypothesis 1N) is that  7 6 5   and   , , γ γ γ  will be positive or zero, and  8 γ  will be 
zero or negative. The alternative hypothesis (Hypothesis 1A) is that  7 6 5   and   , , γ γ γ  will be significantly 
negative, and  8 γ  will be significantly positive. 
0 0, , , : t 8, t 7, t 6, t 5, 1 ≤ ≥ γ γ γ γ N H  vs  0 0, , , : t 8, t 7, t 6, t 5, 1 > < γ γ γ γ A H . 
 
  10To analyze the differences of the pay–performance relations between firms with and without bank-
appointed directors, we estimate the following equation (2) including the cross term of performance 
measures and the bank director’s dummy variable (B). 
it t it t 9, it it t 8, it it t 7, it it t 6,
it it t 5, it t 4, it t 3, it t 2, it t 1, ,
ε + d B B * B * B * RET
B * ROA + + SALE + RET + ROA
+ + Δ + Δ + +
Δ Δ = Δ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
LOSS GSALE
LOSS G CashComp t i     ) 2 (
There are two predictions about the disciplines of bank relationships in Japan. Some scholars point out 
that the discipline of executives is characterized by their bank relationships.
9 We cannot initially 
determine whether or not the discipline of bank-appointed directors is effective. 
The null hypothesis is that bank-appointed directors monitor the executives of firms and help to 
enhance the incentive of executives. Some scholars, such as Grundfest (1990), argue that bank 
relationships reduce the agency cost and allow investors to monitor managers more effectively than in the 
USA. Kaplan (1994) shows that the likelihood of new bank-appointed directors is closely positive with 
negative profit. Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) find that banks are more 
likely to appoint one of their employees as a director when a company is in financial distress.
10 Kaplan 
and Minton (1994) show that bank-appointed directors take an important discipline role, which affects top 
executive turnover in the case of poor performance. In other words, bank-appointed directors are expected 
to monitor the executives of firms and to help enhance the incentive of executives. 
We alternatively hypothesize that bank-appointed directors do not monitor the executives of firms 
effectively and do not help to enhance, but rather decrease, the incentives of executives. Aoki (1990) 
points out that Japanese executives earn profit to satisfy the interests of debt-holders. Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998) show that bank-appointed directors consider the repayment of bank loans and do not think 
                                                 
9 Aoki (1990) and Sheard (1989) argue that Japanese main bank relationships play an important role in corporate 
governance and discipline managers’ poor performance. 
10 Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) discuss the role of bank-appointed directors in detail. 
  11of maximizing firm value. Abe et al. (2005) show that the bonus ratio of firms with bank-appointed 
directors decreases firm performance in Japanese electronics firms.
11 These results suggest that pay–
performance relations are weaker in firms with bank-appointed directors. 
We also propose a hypothesis about the cross terms of the bank-appointed directors’ dummy and the 
four performance variables: ΔROA*B, RET*B, GSALE*B, and LOSS*B. In the null hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2N), we predict that bank-appointed directors help to strengthen pay–performance sensitivity. 
On the other hand, the pay–performance relations in firms with bank-appointed directors are predicted to 
be weaker in the alternative hypothesis (Hypothesis 2A). 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The null hypothesis (Hypothesis 2N) is that  7 6 5   and   , , γ γ γ  will be positive or zero, and  8 γ  will be 
zero or negative. The alternative hypothesis (Hypothesis 2A) is that  7 6 5   and   , , γ γ γ  will be significantly 
negative, and  8 γ  will be significantly positive. 
0 0, , , : t 8, t 7, t 6, t 5, 1 ≤ ≥ γ γ γ γ N H  vs  0 0, , , : t 8, t 7, t 6, t 5, 1 > < γ γ γ γ A H . 
 
4. Results 
Table 4 shows the estimated results of equations (1) from 1992 to 1995. In the second column, we 
show the results of the relations between changes in managerial compensation and each individual 
performance measure and cross terms of the performance measures and financial keiretsu ties (K). In the 
third column, we show the estimated results of equation (1). 
                                                 
11 Abe et al. (2005) find that the bonus ratio of firms with bank-affiliated directors is lower. 
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INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
In the second column, all of the performance measures are statistically significant at the 1% level, and 
their coefficients are 1.163, 0.223, 25.770, and –9.176. These results show the positive pay–performance 
relations. On the other hand, the cross terms of keiretsu memberships and each of performance measures 
(ΔROA*K, RET*K, GSALE*K, and LOSS*K) are insignificant. This indicates that financial keiretsu 
memberships do not affect pay–performance sensitivities. 
In the third column, the estimated result of equation (1) is reported. We find that the relations between 
changes in managerial compensation and ΔROA, RET, and GSALE are significantly positive, and LOSS 
is significantly negative. The coefficients of all the performance measures show positive pay–
performance relations, as does the individual performance measure. The cross terms of keiretsu 
memberships and performance measures (ΔROA*K, RET*K, GSALE*K, and LOSS*K) are also 
insignificant as they were in the second column. We also find no significant relation between change in 
managerial compensation and financial keiretsu ties (K). 
In the third column, the F-statistic for the cross terms of keiretsu memberships and performance 
measures (ΔROA*K, RET*K, GSALE*K, and LOSS*K) is 1.78 and insignificant at the 10% level. This 
indicates that there is no significant difference in sensitivities between firms with and without financial 
keiretsu ties. We also find that there are no significant relations between changes in managerial 
compensation and these cross terms. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1N. This implies that the 
pay–performance sensitivity of firms with financial keiretsu ties is almost the same as firms without them. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
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Table 5 shows the estimated results of equation (2). In the second and third columns, we show the 
relations between changes in managerial compensation and each of the performance measures and the 
cross terms of the performance measures and the bank-appointed dummy variable (B). 
In the second column, we find that changes in managerial compensation are significantly positive for 
ΔROA, RET, and GSALE and negative for LOSS. All of the estimates are statistically significant at the 
1% level, and their coefficients are 1.056, 0.260, 34.531, and –9.548. These results show positive pay–
performance relations. Only the cross term of stock returns and the bank-appointed dummy (RET*B) is 
significantly negative, but the other cross terms (ΔROA*B, GSALE*B, and LOSS*B) are insignificant. 
This indicates that bank-appointed directors do not help to enhance pay–performance sensitivity measured 
as RET, but rather weaken them. 
In the third column, the estimated result of equation (2) is reported. We find that the relations between 
change in managerial compensation and ΔROA, RET, and GSALE are significantly positive and LOSS 
is significantly negative. The coefficients on all the performance measures show the positive pay–
performance relations as well as the individual performance measure. The F-statistic for the cross terms of 
the bank-appointed dummy and the performance measures (ΔROA*B, RET*B, GSALE*B, and LOSS*B) 
is 2.35 and significant at the 10% level. This means a difference in the sensitivities between firms with 
and without bank-appointed directors. We also find that there are positive relations between change in 
managerial compensation and ΔROA, RET, and GSALE, whereas the relation between that and LOSS is 
negative. The coefficients on RET*B and GSALE*B are significantly negative. This result is consistent 
with hypothesis 2A. This implies that the pay–performance sensitivity of firms with bank-appointed 
directors is relatively weak. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
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We also analyze the disciplinary role of financial keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors 
simultaneously. Table 6 also reports the estimated results including cross terms of firm performance 
measures and each of the financial keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors. In the second 
column, we also confirm the positive pay–performance relations. Only the cross term of stock returns and 
bank-appointed dummy is significantly negative. This supports the result that the pay–performance 
sensitivity of firms with bank-appointed directors is relatively weak. 
In the third column, we also find that the cross term of stock returns and the bank-appointed dummy is 
significantly negative. In addition, the F-statistics for the cross terms of the bank-appointed dummy and 
the performance measures (ΔROA*B, RET*B, GSALE*B, and LOSS*B) are significant at the 10% level 
and those of both the bank-appointed dummy and financial keiretsu ties and firm performance measures 
are significant at the 5% level. These results also support the idea that the disciplinary role of the bank-
appointed directors is relatively weak. 
Our findings are summarized as the following two points. First, the financial keiretsu ties did not 
function well in enhancing the pay–performance sensitivities. Second, the role of bank-appointed 
monitors was not effective. We can infer that the discipline of a relationship with financial keiretsu ties 
and bank-appointed monitors did not operate well in the 1990s, although Japanese executives were 
motivated by desirable incentive compensation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examined the relations between the role of Japanese disciplinary mechanisms such as 
financial keiretsu ties and bank-appointed directors and pay–performance sensitivity in Japan. First, we 
analyzed the differences in pay–performance relations between firms with and without financial keiretsu 
ties. Second, we compared the differences in managerial compensation and firm performance between 
firms with and without bank-appointed directors by regressing the cross term of bank-appointed directors 
and performance measures.   16
Our findings provide new interpretations of previous Japanese studies such as Kaplan (1994), Kato 
and Kubo (2006), and Mitsudome et al. (2008) and are summarized as the following two points. The first 
finding is that there is no significant difference in pay–performance sensitivity between firms with and 
without financial keiretsu ties in this period. This result implies that the disciplinary role of financial 
keiretsu memberships did not function well in the 1990s. This result suggests that the effective 
disciplinary role of keiretsu in the 1980s as shown in Kato (1997) was weakened in the 1990s. 
Second, we found that the pay–performance relations for RET and GSALE of firms with bank-
appointed directors are negative. This result implies that bank-appointed directors were not effective 
monitors of managerial compensation in the 1990s. 
In the 1990s, after the bubble-burst period, the Japanese relationship-oriented system was believed to 
be mainly supported by the financial keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed monitors. Our results 
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Table 1 
Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables   
The change ratio of managerial 
compensation 
(ΔCashComp, %） 
The percentage changes in average cash compensation per director. Average 
cash is comprised of salaries and bonuses of all board members divided by the 
number of board members. 
Firm Performance Variables   
Differences in return on assets 
(differences in ROA, %) 
The first differences in ROA (return on Assets: net profit divided by total 
assets). 
Stock return (%)  The rate of stock return, measured as stock price at year end plus dividend per 
share for the year dividend per share by the beginning stock price less one. 
The growth rate of sales (%)  The rate of growth of sales 
Loss/profit dummy  1 if a firm’s net profit is negative in year t, 0 otherwise. 
Governance Variables   
Financial Keiretsu dummy 
(K,(1,0)) 
1 if firms belong to financial Keiretsu, 0 otherwise. 
Bank-appointed directors dummy 
(B, (1, 0)) 
1 if a commercial bank appoints at least one director to the board, 0 otherwise.   21
Table 2   
 Descriptive statistics   
Variable Mean  Median  Std.  dev. 
 
Dependent Variables 
    
The change ratio of managerial compensation 
(ΔCashComp, %) 
–0.179 –1.606  19.178 
Firm Performance Variables    
Differences in ROA (ΔROA, %)  –0.187 –0.098 2.673 
Stock return (RET, %)  –6.294  –7.250 21.403 
Growth rate of sales (GSALE, %)  –1.666  –1.369  9.292 
Loss/profit dummy  0.162  0.000  0.369 
Governance Variables      
Keiretsu dummy  0.113  0.000  0.317 
Bank-appointed director dummy  0.387  0.000  0.487 
Note. We report descriptive statistics for the total and split sample. In the right column, the p-value of the mean 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics  
Panel A Mean differences between firms with or without Financial keiretsu ties 
 
Variable 
keiretsu = 0 
Mean 
(n = 1,852) 






Dependent Variables     
The change ratio of managerial compensation 
(ΔCashComp, %) 
-0.014  -1.469 
0.273 
Firm Performance Variables    
Differences in ROA (ΔROA, %)  -0.204  -0.050  0.403 
Stock return (RET, %)  -6.355  -5.819  0.717 
Growth rate of sales (GSALE, %)  1.833  -0.204  0.166 
Loss/profit dummy  0.161  0.174  0.615 
Panel B Mean differences between firms with or without Bank-appointed director 
 
Variable 
Bank = 0 
Mean 
(n = 1,279) 
Bank = 1 
Mean 




Dependent Variables     
The change ratio of managerial compensation 
(ΔCashComp, %) 
–0.356  0.101  0.596 
Firm Performance Variables    
Differences in ROA (ΔROA, %)  –0.127 –0.281 0.201 
Stock return (RET, %)  –5.949 – 6.841  0.354 
Growth rate of sales (GSALE, %)  –1.504  –1.922  0.317 
Loss/profit dummy  0.148  0.185  0.023 
**
 
Note. In panel A, we report descriptive statistics for the total and split sample if firms belong to financial Keiretsu. 
In the right column, we report the p-value of the t-statistic to test for differences in the means between the two 
groups with and without financial keiretsu memberships. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the total and split 
sample if the board includes a bank-affiliated director. In the right column, we report the p-value of the t-statistic to 
test for differences in the means between the two groups with and without bank-affiliated directors. 
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The change ratio of  Managerial 
compensation 
 (1 Variable, %) 
(3) 
The change ratio of Managerial 
compensation 
 (4 Variable, %) 














R-squared 0.041   












R-squared 0.048   











R-squared 0.033   












R-squared 0.049  0.082 
F-statistic (All cross-terms of 




Note. The change ratio of  Managerial compensation is regressed against the independent variables in column (1). In 
column (2), we show the regression results using individual performance variables and their cross-terms of the 
financial keiretsu dummy. In column (3), we show the regression results using all performance variables and their 
cross-terms of the financial Keiretsu dummy. All independent variables are measured from t–1 to t. All regressions 




significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The null hypothesis of the F test is that all cross terms of 
keiretsu dummy variables are equal to zero. 
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The change ratio of Managerial 
compensation 
 (1 Variable, %) 
(4) 
The change ratio of Managerial 
compensation 
 (4 Variable, %) 














R-squared  0.042   






Stock return (RET)  







R-squared  0.050   






Growth rate of sales (GSALE) 






R-squared 0.034   






Loss/profit dummy  





R-squared  0.049  0.087 
F-statistic  (All cross-terms of 





Note. The change ratio of Managerial compensation is regressed against the independent variables in column (1). In 
column (2), we show the regression results using individual performance variables and their cross-terms of the bank-
appointed director dummy. In column (3), we show the regression results using all performance variables and their 
cross-terms of the bank-appointed director dummy. All independent variables are measured from t–1 to t. All 




denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The null hypothesis of the F test is that all cross-terms 
of bank-appointed director dummy variables are equal to zero.   25




The change ratio of Managerial 
compensation 
 (1 Variable, %) 
(3) 
The change ratio of Managerial 
compensation 
 (4 Variable, %) 




















R-squared  0.042   












Stock return (RET)  







R-squared  0.051   




















R-squared 0.034   












Loss/profit dummy  





R-squared  0.049  0.089   26
F-statistic (All cross-terms of 










F-statistic (All cross-terms of 
Keiretsu Dummy= cross-terms of 





Note. The change ratio of Managerial compensation is regressed against the independent variables in column (1). In 
column (2), we show the regression results using individual performance variables and their cross-terms of both 
Keiretsu and the bank-appointed director dummy. In column (3), we show the regression results using all 
performance variables and their cross-terms of both Keiretsu and the bank-appointed director dummy. All 
independent variables are measured from t–1 to t. All regressions include dummy variables for the time period. P-
values are in parentheses. Superscripts 
*, 
**, and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The 
null hypothesis of the F test (All cross-terms of Keiretsu Dummy= 0) is that all cross-terms of Keiretsu dummy 
variables are equal to zero. The null hypothesis of the F test (All cross-terms of Bank Dummy= 0) is that all cross-
terms of bank-appointed director dummy variables are equal to zero. The null hypothesis of the F test (All cross-
terms of Keiretsu Dummy= cross-terms of Bank Dummy= 0) is that all cross-terms of Keiretsu and bank-appointed 
director dummy variables are equal to zero. 
 
 
 